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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CoURTs-MARTIAL-PowER OF CONGRESS To 
PROVIDE FOR MILITARY JURISDICTION OVER CIVILIAN DEPENDENTS-Defend-
ants, civilian wives of servicemen living overseas, were tried and convicted 
of murder by military court-martial under article 118 of the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice.1 Their trials took place in the countries where they 
were living with their husbands. Defendants brought petitions for a writ 
of habeas corpus challenging the constitutionality of article 2(11) of the 
Uniform Code2 authorizing their trials by court-martial. Initially the 
164 Stat. 140 (1950), 50 U.S.C. (1952) §712. Murder is a capital offense under the 
Uniform Code. 
2 64 Stat. 109 (1950), 50 U.S.C. (1952) §552(11). 
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United States Supreme Court rejected this contention.8 On rehearing, 
held, reversed, two justices dissenting. The guarantee of the right to jury 
trial contained in article 3, section 2, and the guarantees of the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments restrict the government no matter where it is acting. 
Treaties and executive agreements cannot confer power upon Congress 
to provide for court-martial of dependents of military personnel in violation 
of the foregoing constitutional guarantees. The exception of "cases arising 
in the land and naval forces" to the Fifth Amendment right of indictment 
by grand jury does not include civilian dependents of servicemen with 
troops overseas, for they are not in the 1and and naval forces, and neither 
the power "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land 
and naval Forces"4 nor the necessary and proper clause5 can include them 
within the exception.6 Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, 
and Brennan comprised the majority. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan 
concurred separately, refusing in capital cases to hold that dependents 
are so closely related to the armed forces as to make trial by court-martial 
essential to the effective "government and regulation of the land and naval 
forces." Justices Clark and Burton dissented, arguing that the prior hear-
ings correctly decided that the power of Congress to establish legislative 
courts outside the United States made court-martial jurisdiction constitu-
tional, and that in any case jurisdiction was constitutional under the power 
of Congress "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land 
and naval forces." Reid v. Covert; Kinsella v. Krueger, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
The Court in holding such trials unconstitutional virtually overruled 
In re Ross,1 on which the holding in the original hearing had been based. 
That case had upheld trial by consular court of a seaman serving on an 
American ship for murder of a ship's officer. The rejection and overruling 
of that case is not surprising in view of the historical context in which it 
arose. The doctrine of extraterritoriality, popular at the turn of the century, 
is not accepted as desirable at the present time,8 and the Court's declaring 
it a historical relic9 is in keeping with the modern view. Although the 
"Insular Cases,"10 used to buttress the holding in the original hearing, were 
3 Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956); Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956). See 
comment, 55 MICH. L. REv. 114 (1956). 
4 U.S. CONST., art. I, §8, cl. 14. 
5 U.S. CoNsr., art. I, §8, cl. 18. 
6 It was accepted without question by the Court that the exception clause of the 
Fifth Amendment applies equally to the provisions of the Sixth Amendment although 
not specifically mentioned there. This construction has never been seriously questioned 
by -the Court. See Ex -parte Milligan, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 2 (1866); Ex parte Quirin, 317 
U.S. I (1942). 
7 140 U.S. 453 (1891). 
s The remaining consular courts of the United States were abolisl:ied recently by 
Congress. 70 Stat. 773 (1956). 
9 Principal case at 12. 
10 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); 
Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922). The 
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sharply criticized and limited in the principal case, the problem before the 
Court in those cases was so entirely different from that before the Court in 
the principal case that the rejection of them as not controlling should not 
be considered as a rejection of the "fundamental right" doctrine for which 
they stand. The language of the opinion11 casts some doubt on the validity 
of the doctrine but the cases' relationship to the principal cases is so slight 
that it would be unwise to declare those cases overruled by the principal 
opinion. Furthur, both of the concurrences and the dissent state that the 
doctrine still has validity.12 
Trial by court-martial (rather than by the courts of foreign countries) 
was authorized in both of the principal cases by executive agreements,13 
and it was argued that the power of Congress to implement executive 
agreements14 made such court-martial jurisdiction constitutional. By re-
jecting this argument the Court clarified the relationship between treaties 
and executive agreements and the limits on congressional action imposed 
by the Constitution. Since Missouri v. Holland15 this relationship has been 
in doubt and this doubt was the propulsive force behind the Bricker 
Amendment.16 The holding does not conflict with the decisions in Missouri 
v. Holland or two subsequent cases17 dealing with executive agreements, 
because in none of those cases was the court faced directly with an inter-
national agreement which conflicted with a constitutional guarantee.18 If 
Court held that "unincorporated" territories of the United States are not a part of the 
Union so that portions of the Constitution do not apply. Persons in those territories 
were held to be entitled only to those rights which are fundamental to this country's 
system of government, and the right to jury trial is not a fundamental right. The fact 
that these territories had entirely different systems of jurisprudence and different customs 
from the United States, making rapid conversion to American methods impossible or at 
least highly impractical, was the controlling factor in the decisions. Obviously this factor 
is not present in the military justice case and the cases should not be applied in this 
entirely different situation. 
11 Principal case at 14: "Moreover, it is our judgment that neither the cases nor 
their reasoning should be given any further expansion." 
12 Principal case at 53, 67, 74, 79. 
13 England: Executive Agreement of July 27, 1942, 57 Stat. 1193 (1942); Japan: Ad-
ministrative Agreement, 3 U.S.T. 3341 (1952). Both agreements provided that United 
States service courts would be willing and able to try and punish offenses against the 
laws of the foreign nation ,by members of the United States armed forces, civilian com-
ponent, and their dependents. 
H 252 U.S. 416 (1920), holding that legislation implementing a treaty with Great 
Britain for the protection of migratory birds does not violate the Tenth Amendment. 
15 Article 2(11) of the Uniform Code includes langnage indicating specifically that it 
is to implement treaties and administrative agreements. 
10 See Bricker, "Constitutional Insurance for a Safe Treaty-Making Policy," 60 DICK. 
L. R.Ev. 103 (1956). 
17 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); United States v. 
Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
18 In the principal case the Court was not forced to strike down legislation as to a 
currently operative international agreement as both agreements have been superseded 
by treaty provisions which do not specifically provide that service courts will be able to 
try offenses against the laws of foreign nations. See NATO Status of Forces ,Agreement, 
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this holding is followed in the future it will limit the treaty power to those 
areas in which the government is not prohibited from acting.10 
The keystone of the Court's opinion is the interpretation given to the 
phrase "cases arising in the land and naval forces," for if defendants are 
not included in this exception to the Fifth Amendment, the necessary and 
proper clause cannot remove their right to trial by jury. This was the view 
taken in United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,20 and the opinion in the 
principal case is merely an extension of that doctrine limiting the necessary 
and proper clause as it relates to military justice. It can be argued, how-
ever, as it was by Justice Reed in his dissent in the Toth case,21 that the 
interpretation given to the exception clause of the Fifth Amendment is too 
narrow, for the clause refers to cases arising in the land and naval forces 
and not to persons in the land and naval forces. Therefore, it should not 
be limited to persons actually in the military service, but should embrace 
persons closely related to the armed forces, including dependents overseas. 
The interpretation of the principal case,22 making trial of many offenses 
by civilian dependents practically impossible, creates many problems for 
the armed forces,23 which lend force to the test proposed by the concurring 
justices. Under that test the Court would be able to analyze each case, 
much as it analyzes due process cases, to determine whether the method of 
trial established by Congress is sufficiently essential to the effective govern-
ment of the armed forces to outweigh the deprivation to civilians of jury 
trial. In light of the varying views of the justices in the principal case it is 
difficult to determine the present limits of court-martial jurisdiction of 
civilians. While civilian dependents in a capital case clearly cannot be 
court-martialled, the Court specifically refrained from indicating the status 
of civilian employees of the armed forces overseas. Moreover, the capital 
4 U.S.T. 1792 (1953); Amendment of Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement 
under Article III of the Security Treaty, 4 U.S.T. 1846 (1953). It is interesting to note 
that never has a treaty been struck down by the Court as contrary to the Constitution. 
In this area the Court is faced with the international problems resulting from the failure 
or inability of the nation to live up to its foreign commitments. See CORWIN, THE CoN-
srrrurroN OF THE UNITED STATF.S 412-445 (1953); 70 HARv. L. REV. 1043 (1957). 
10 Prior to 1900 there were several cases in which appeared dicta that a treaty could 
not override •the specific provisions of the Constitution. See, e.g., The Cherokee Tobacco, 
11 Wall. (78 U.S.) 616 at 620 (1870); Holden v. Joy, 17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 211 at 243 (1872): 
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 at 267 (1890). Until the principal case, however, such 
statements have never been necessary to the decision of a case. 
20,350 U.S. 11 (1955). The Court held that a former serviceman who ·had ,been dis-
charged from the service could not be tried by court-martial for crimes committed abroad 
during his term of service. 
21 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, note 20 supra, at 37. 
22 The Court expressed a fear of military control of the civilian population and 
of military government. Much the same viewpoint is shown in -the Toth opinion. In 
view of these pronouncements it is not surprising to find the justices strictly limiting 
the scope of the exception clause. 
23 The alternatives to court-martial of dependents are given in the principal case by 
Justices Clark and Harlan in their opinions. See principal case at 72 and 86 to 89. 
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and non-capital clistinction24 was so clearly defined by Justices Frankfurter25 
and Harlan26 that it is not difficult to foresee both men supporting a court-
martial should a non-capital case arise. They would be joined by Justices 
Clark and Burton, who support court-martial jurisdiction in any overseas 
military dependent case, so the Court would be evenly divided, with Justice 
Whittaker in the tie-breaking position. Trials of civilians connected with 
the military forces in wartime present an analogous but different problem, 
and jurisdiction of courts-martial in that situation is more easily supported 
under the war powers of Congress and the President.21 The Toth case and 
the principal case have indicated that the Court will rather severely restrict 
court-martial jurisdiction over civilians. The extent to which it will be 
permitted can be determined only by subsequent decisions.28 Since four 
justices would make the practicalities of the situation controlling,29 it is 
doubtful that military jurisdiction will be much further limited. 
Gerald M. Smith 
24 This distinction has been used by the Court .before. Compare Powell v. Alabama, 
287 U.S. 45 (1932), with Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
25 Principal case at 45. 
26 Principal case at 65. 
27 See generally Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 
l!41 (1952). But see Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 2 (1866); Duncan v. K.ahanamoku, 
327 U.S. 304 (1946). 
28 See generally 55 MICH. L. REV. 114 (1956). 
29 Justice Frankfurter, principal case at 44; Justice Harlan, principal case at 75; 
Justices Clark and Burton, principal case at 83. 
